Most violent crimes happen in urban and suburban cities. With emerging tracking techniques, law enforcement officers can have real-time location information of the escaping criminals and dynamically adjust the security resource allocation to interdict them. Unfortunately, existing work on urban network security games largely ignores such information. This paper addresses this omission. First, we show that ignoring the real-time information can cause an arbitrarily large loss of efficiency. To mitigate this loss, we propose a novel NEtwork purSuiT game (NEST) model that captures the interaction between an escaping adversary and a defender with multiple resources and real-time information available. Second, solving NEST is proven to be NP-hard. Third, after transforming the non-convex program of solving NEST to a linear program, we propose our incremental strategy generation algorithm, including: (i) novel pruning techniques in our best response oracle; and (ii) novel techniques for mapping strategies between subgames and adding multiple best response strategies at one iteration to solve extremely large problems. Finally, extensive experiments show the effectiveness of our approach, which scales up to realistic problem sizes with hundreds of nodes on networks including the real network of Manhattan.
Introduction
In 2016, there were nearly 5.36 million violent crimes across the United States, most of which happened in the urban and suburban cities (NCVRW 2016) . Considering just the commercial banks, 4,185 robberies happened (FBI 2017) . When an urban crime occurs, the top priority of law enforcement officers is to dispatch the limited security resources to capture the criminal. Nowadays, novel pursuit devices such as the StarChase GPS-based system (Gaither et al. 2017) , UAVs and helicopters can provide the police with the realtime location of the criminal. Equipped with the up to date information, the police can dynamically adjust the resource allocation plan to interdict the adversary.
Unfortunately, existing work on resource allocation in network security ignores the real-time information about the adversary's location (Jain et al. 2011; McCarthy et al. 2016; Wang et al. 2018) . Specifically, in existing urban network security games (NSG), the defender usually deploys a time- independent strategy without considering the dynamic relocation of security resources (Jain et al. 2011) . Although a time-dependent policy is discussed in (Zhang et al. 2017 ), they do not take the real-time adversarial information into consideration, which can cause a huge loss of effectiveness as we will show later. Other branches of related work also suffer from similar myopia, including pursuit-evasion games (Parsons 1978) and patrolling security games (Vorobeychik et al. 2014 ) (see the next section).
To incorporate such real-time information, we model the urban network security problem as a zero-sum NEtwork purSuiT game (NEST). In NEST, the adversary picks one escape path to the outside world, while the defender, tracking the adversary's previous moves, decides on the relocation of her security resources (modeled as a finite-horizon Markov Decision Process (MDP)). Specifically, in the MDP, each state includes information about the adversary's previous moves and the locations of defender resources, and each action is the next location of the defender's resources. This results in a game with a combinatorial action space of each state in the MDP for the defender, where the defender has multiple resources with several actions each. For example, for just ten resources with four actions for each, there are more than one million joint actions of resources in a given state. This large strategy space makes the existing exact solution approaches unable to solve NEST efficiently. These approaches include: i) the approach for the imperfect recall game, i.e., normal-form game with sequential strategies (NFGSS), because their incremental strategy generation (ISG) algorithm does not set bounds to cut branches in its best-response (BR) oracle that uses a depth-first search through the whole state space to compute the best response (Bošanskỳ et al. 2015) ; and ii) the approach for the perfect recall game (Von Stengel 1996) because it will lead to a significantly larger strategy space than the imperfect recall approach (see the discussion in (Bošanskỳ et al. 2015) ), and the bounds are very loose in their branch-and-bound BR (Bošanskỳ et al. 2014) .
In this context, after modeling NEST as an imperfectrecall game to reduce the strategy space, this paper makes four additional key contributions. First, we show that the ignorance of real-time information in existing work can lead to an arbitrarily large loss of efficiency. Second, we show that solving NEST is NP-hard. Third, after transforming the non-convex program of solving NEST to a linear program (LP), we propose our ISG with the following novelty: (i) novel pruning techniques in our BR, including: (1) providing tight lower and upper bounds by exploiting the combinatorial structure of each state's action space; and (2) handling imperfect recall by developing an effective lower bound transition method that causes an evaluated state to be reevaluated only if a prefix state with a smaller lower bound transits to it; and (ii) novel techniques to speed up our ISG to solve extremely large-scale problems, which include: (1) mapping the computed defender strategy by BR between similar subgames to speed up BR, which also speeds up LP if this strategy is optimal; and (2) adding multiple best response strategies to the restricted game at one iteration against different sampled adversary strategies to reduce the number of iterations for convergence. Finally, experiments show that our approach can scale up to problem sizes with hundreds of nodes on networks including the real network of Manhattan. Thus, for the first time, this paper shows that ISG techniques can also be scaled for dynamic games when best-response oracles are tuned with domain-specific pruning techniques, and other domain-specific improvements are employed.
Related Work
The pursuit-evasion game (PEG) typically assumes that the evader knows the locations of the pursuer's units, but the pursuer does not know the location of the evader (Parsons 1978; Horák and Bošanskỳ 2016 ). While our model is a variant of PEG, we focus on a realistic setting in our motivating scenario where the defender has the adversary's real-time location information. Most of the work on PEGs cannot capture the special structure of specific problems. For example, although the partially observable stochastic game (Horák, Bosanskỳ, and Pechoucek 2017) is domainindependent, their model focuses on infinite-horizon games. Similarly, the patrolling security game (PSG) (Basilico, Gatti, and Amigoni 2009; Vorobeychik et al. 2014) , where the defender defends an environment against an unseen intruder who needs multiple turns to perform the attack, is typically modeled as a stochastic game with infinite horizon. Recently, PSGs have been extended to cover the situation that the defender receives a spatially uncertain signal after being attacked , and has to reach the attacked target to catch the attacker. However, this signal response game does not consider real-time information after receiving the signal due to the fact that no more information is available for the defender after receiving the signal.
ISG has been successfully used to exactly solve many games (Jain et al. 2011; Bošanskỳ et al. 2014; Wang et al. 2018) , whose core part is to compute the best response strategy. However, the existing exact solution approaches for both imperfect recall games and perfect recall games are unable to solve NEST efficiently. Firstly, NEST is similar to an imperfect recall game NFGSS (Bošanskỳ et al. 2015) , but NFGSS does not consider real-time information. Note that the general form of imperfect recall games cannot be exactly solved by a linear program (Čermák et al. 2018 ). Although NFGSS is solved by combining ISG with the network-flow representation of strategies (Jiang et al. 2013 ), its algorithm is impractical for the large NEST as their ISG's BR with a depth-first search does not set bounds to cut branches and then evaluates all related states to compute the best response. Secondly, if NEST is modeled as a perfect recall game (Von Stengel 1996) , it will lead to a significantly larger strategy space than the imperfect recall approach (see the discussion in (Bošanskỳ et al. 2015) ). Moreover, the branchand-bound BR in the latest exact algorithm for perfect recall games (Bošanskỳ et al. 2014 ) is still impractical for the large NEST because its bounds are very loose. More specifically, in their BR, the upper bound for each node always equals the maximum possible value of the game, and the lower bound for each succeeding node of the first node in the information set for the searching player always equals the minimum possible value of the game. The immediate result is that at least one succeeding state of each action will be evaluated. However, it is impractical to evaluate at least one succeeding state for each action in each state in NEST because NEST has an extremely large state space and a large action space for each state in the MDP for the defender.
Motivating Scenario
To illustrate the underlying issues and motivation for our model, we analyze the problem of police vehicle pursuits. Recently, a new pursuit technology (Fischbach, Hadsdy, and McCal 2015; Gaither et al. 2017) based on GPS has been tested and deployed in many cities, e.g., New York (Shook 2017) in America and Delta (Baker 2017) in Canada. This technology developed by StarChase (see http://www.starchase.com) provides police officers with real-time (every 3 to 5 seconds (Gaither et al. 2017) ) GPS locations of the fleeing vehicle. However, it does not mean that the evader will always be captured. For example, in the urban scenario discussed in (Gaither et al. 2017) , even obtaining the real-time information provided by StarChase GPSbased system, police officers only achieved 61% apprehension rate. Outside the cities, i.e., in the open area, it may be even harder to capture the evader. Cities, however, have more advanced facilities and security resources, which make it much easier to locate the evader's location in real time and capture him. Therefore, we can set the roads to the outside of cities as the exit points. In addition, based on the data in (Reaves 2017) , about 10% of 5,568 pursuits ended because the vehicle crossed into another jurisdiction. In such a context, we can set the roads to other jurisdictions as the exit points. Meanwhile, about 50% of cases discussed in (Fischbach, Hadsdy, and McCal 2015) lasted more than 5 minutes, and the maximum time is 50 minutes. Therefore, police officers have limited but sufficient time to deploy security resources to interdict the evader with the aid of the real-time information about the evader.
Our approach is also suitable for security problems in other domains including interdicting poachers in the field, where UAVs can provide poachers' location information in real time (Bondi et al. 2018) ; and combating the threat of piracy or fighting against illegal fishing on the sea, where a new system can track ships or boats in real time (Reid 2018 ).
Problem Description
The NEtwork purSuiT game (NEST) is played between an evader (adversary) and police officers (defender) on an urban road network G " pV, Eq consisting of a set of directed edges E representing roads and a set of nodes V representing intersections. W.l.o.g., we assume that the time it takes to travel through each road segment is one time unit, e.g., 1 minute, since we can add dummy nodes to separate each road into several segments with equal length. We denote by V e the set of exit nodes, through which the adversary can escape to the external world. The adversary, initially located at node v a 0 , tries to escape to the external world, while the defender deploys m identical resources (police officers/teams), initially located at intersections v 1 0 , . . . , v m 0 P V , to catch him. The adversary is caught if he and one of the defender resources reach the same node at the same time 1 . We assume that v a 0 ‰ v r 0 for all r P R " t1, . . . , mu. The adversary cannot see the defender until he gets caught (Jain et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 2017) . Motivated by the fact that new pursuit technology can be used to provide real-time information about the adversary's whereabouts, the defender can observe the adversary's locations in real time. The initial positions of both players are common knowledge. For example, police officers are notified about the location of the crime, while the locations of the police stations are public information. Adversary's Strategies: A pure adversary strategy is a path from his initial node v a 0 to an exit node v e P V e , represented by a sequence of nodes o visited by the adversary with a length no longer than t max 2 (time horizon), where any pair of consecutive nodes are connected by an edge in E. The set of adversary pure strategies is denoted by O. The mixed strategy is a probability distribution over O, denoted by y " xy o y where y o represents the probability of escaping through path o. An observed history h is a sequence of nodes where the adversary is spotted. We say that h 1 is a descendant of h or h Ă h 1 if h is any strict prefix of h 1 . We denote by O h " to | o P O, h Ď ou the set of paths generating history h, H " th|Do P O, h Ď ou the set of valid histories, and CH h " th 1 | h 1 P H, Dv P V, h 1 " h¨v : v will be reached at the next step after generating history hu the set of child histories of h. Defender's Strategies: The defender's decision problem is modeled as an MDP. Let l " pv A pure strategy for the defender is a deterministic policy π : S Ñ A. Each state s P S consists of two components, the current location l s P L and the observed history h s P H of the adversary's moves from the initial state to state s, i.e., s " pl s , h s q. Let η : H Ñ V return the last node in history h P H. A state s is called a capture state if there exists a resource r P R such that v r ls " ηph s q. We denote by S c the set of capture states. On the other hand, if ηph s q P V e and there exists no resource allocated on ηph s q, the adversary successfully escapes, and such a state is called an escape state. Let S e denote the set of all escape states. Let the terminal state set be S t " S c Y S e and the initial state be s 0 " pl 0 , xv a 0 yq. Each action a P A corresponds to a onestep move from the current location l to the adjacent location l 1 . Thus, we abuse the notation slightly and let A and L be exchangeable, such that each action is a location to which the defender plans to transfer her resources. We denote by A s the set of actions in s P SzS t . Specifically, we denote by S s,l the set of states reached from s by taking action l P A s , i.e., S s,l " ts 1 | s 1 " pl, hq, h P CH hs u, and we say that s 1 P S s,l is a succeeding state of s. We denote by x the behavior strategy of the defender, where in each non-terminal state s, x defines a probability distribution over A s . Utilities: Assume that the game is zero-sum as we are only concerned with whether the defender can capture the adversary or not. If it is a capture state, the defender receives a unit reward, and the adversary suffers a unit loss; otherwise, both players receive a zero payoff. That is, u d psq "´u a psq " 1 if s P S c and u d psq " u a psq " 0 if s P S e . Given strategy profile px, oq, we denote by P x,o psq the probability that state s is reached. Notice that: i) if h s Ę o, i.e., the escaping path o does not generate history h s , P x,o psq " 0; and ii) otherwise, P x,o psq only depends on x and h s , and is independent of the adversary's moves after h s . Therefore, we can denote by P x psq the probability of reaching state s under px, oq with h s Ď o. P x psq is determined by the following recursive equation:
where the summation is over states that can transit to s. Given profile px, oq, the defender's expected utility is:
Since the game is zero-sum, U a px, yq "´U d px, yq. Equilibrium: We use Nash equilibrium (NE) as the solution concept as both players move simultaneously. Generally, px ‹ , y ‹ q is NE if and only if:
Theoretical Analysis
This section first shows the cost of ignoring the real-time information, and then proves that solving NEST is NP-hard. Cost of Ignoring Information: Here, we denote the strategy that does not consider the up to date information about the adversary as the non-real-time strategy and its counterpart as the real-time strategy. Consider the example in the left figure, where a unique defender resource is at node 6, the adversary is at node 1, and exit nodes are 4 and 5. If the defender ignores the real-time information, in the worst case (under the NE of the zero-sum game), the adversary reaches each exit node with probability 0.5, while the defender's optimal non-realtime strategy moves the single resource to nodes 4 or 5 with equal probability. That is to say, the defender's expected utility is 0.5. However, the defender can ensure the capture of the adversary by doing the following. (i) If the adversary's current location is at the starting node, the defender just stays at node 6. (ii) When the adversary moves to node 2, the defender moves her resource to node 5, and 4 if she observes that the adversary has moved to node 3. As long as the time horizon is finite, the defender will capture the adversary for sure, and the expected utility is 1, much higher than 0.5. Proposition 1. The defender's optimal non-real-time strategy under the NE can be arbitrarily worse compared with the optimal real-time strategy under the NE.
3
Complexity Analysis Theorem 1. Computing the NE of NEST is NP-hard.
Computing the Optimal Solution
This section first transforms the non-convex program of computing the NE to LP, then develops our ISG algorithm with a novel BR oracle, and finally proposes two additional techniques to speed up our ISG significantly.
Transformation to the Linear Program
The NE strategy x ‹ of the defender in NEST can be computed by:
x s,l P r0, 1s, @l P A s , @s P SzS t (2d) Unfortunately, program (2) is non-convex, since the probability P x psq of reaching state s involves multiplication of various entities in x due to the recursive property defined in Eq.(1). To transform it to an LP, based on the propagation of the probability starting from s 0 towards terminal states, we develop a flow representation of the defender's strategy. Definition 1. f is the flow representation of the defender's strategy where f s,l specifies the probability that the defender reaches state s P SzS t and takes the action l P A s .
Given f and o, the defender's expected utility is: Eqs.(3a)-(3c) ensure that f is feasible, which is initialized by Eq.(3a), and Eq.(3b) is the flow conservation equality.
We now show how to derive the associated flow representation from the behavior strategy and vice versa. Given x, its corresponding flow representation f is:
Given f , P x psq" ř s 1 PSzSt:sPS s 1 ,ls f s 1 ,ls if s‰s 0 , P x psq"1 if s"s 0 , and its corresponding behavior strategy x is:
Pxpsq if P x psq ą 0,
We prove that the flow representation is equivalent with the behavior strategy in terms of expected utility in Theorem 2. Theorem 2. For any pair of x and f satisfying Eqs. (4) and
Finally, we obtain the following LP equivalent with (2).
Incremental Strategy Generation
Although we can compute the optimal solution with LP (6), it does not scale up due to the exponentially large state space.
To mitigate this issue, we propose the Iteratively Generated Reachable States (IGRS) algorithm shown in Algorithm 1, which works as follows. Starting from the restricted NEST GpS 1 , A 1 q where S 1 Ă S and A 1 Ă A, LP (6) solves the equilibrium px, yq on GpS 1 , A 1 q (Line 3). 4 We then solve the defender's best response policy π in the original strategy space pS, Aq (Line 4) and expand A 1 and S 1 (Lines 5-8). Defender's Best Response: Our Best-Response (BR) algorithm shown in Algorithm 2 computes the best deterministic π against the adversary's strategy y. Due to the large strategy space, to speed up, BR adopts a branch-and-bound approach in a depth-first manner. A branch is a state with an expected value representing the probability of catching the adversary starting from this branch. The lower bound of a branch is the minimum value that this branch must obtain in order to be part of the best response, while its upper bound is the maximum value. Using these bounds, BR cuts branches which will certainly not be part of the best response. BR works as follows. Given a state s, if BR does not terminate at Lines 1 and 2, BR estimates bounds and cuts branches if: (1) the upper bound B l of action l is less than its lower bound (V psq` ) (Line 13); (2) the upper bound B pl,hq of succeeding state pl, hq is not more than 0 (Line 15) or is less than its lower bound b pl,hq (Line 17); or (3) the state value V pl, hq is less than b pl,hq (Line 20). Then, BR updates action value Q l and returns state value V psq " max l Q l (Lines 21-24).
Specifically, BR estimates tight bounds as follows. Firstly, given the combinatorial action space, BR estimates tight upper bounds (Lines 3-10 and 14). The idea is that, given a joint action l, BR can estimate all the possible paths that the defender has a chance to interdict (i.e., the possibly interdicted path set (PIPS)) by taking l. That is, given a resource r's action l r in l and an adversary path o P O hs , BR can determine if r taking l r has a chance to interdict o by comparing the time from its current adversary location ηph s q to exit node v e P o through o and the shortest time from action (location) l r to v e (Line 5). Thus, BR obtains l r 's PIPS (O r,lr (Line 6) initialized as H with the corresponding best action candidate set A 1 s prq), l's PIPS (O l (Line 9)), and pl, hq's PIPS (O l X O h (Line 14)). Secondly, to be the best action, an action's value must be larger than the obtained maximum action value, and then the lower bounds for the remaining actions and succeeding states will adaptively increase. Specifically, V psq is initialized at Line 11 to guarantee that the best action is computed if s's optimal value V ‹ psq " b s ; and b l,h is estimated by assuming that all the remaining succeeding states will return the maximum value (Line 16). In addition, BR effectively handles imperfect recall of NEST where a state may be visited by different prefix states. To avoid repeated computation, BR stores the computed state value for state s as V psq that is immediately returned if s is visited again (Line 1). However, while setting tight bounds, only using this method may cause some wrong cuts. Here, if b s (that is set for s while being visited by its prefix state s 1 ) is tight, and V psq is computed such that V psq ă b s , then V psq may not be optimal because some cuts may happen. If V psq is not optimal (i.e., V psq ă V ‹ psq ă b s ) and s is revisited by another prefix state s 2 with b 1 s such that V psq ă b 1 s ă V ‹ psq, then the wrong cut will happen in s 2 after V psq is returned to s 2 . To avoid these wrong cuts, BR records the computed state value with the corresponding lower bound (recorded as bpsq) if this value is less than this bound (Line 23), and this value will be recomputed only if this state's prefix state with a smaller lower bound transits to it (Line 1).
Theorem 3. IGRS converges to an NE.
Improving the Scalability of IGRS
Even though our IGRS is far more efficient than LP, it still cannot handle the very large NEST. Thus, we further improve the scalability of IGRS by developing two techniques 5 . The first technique is to map the computed defender strategy by BR in a subgame to its similar subgames to speed up BR. Here, NEST is the full game, and part of NEST is the subgame. Moreover, if this computed strategy is optimal in NEST (i.e., part of the equilibrium in NEST), we can also speed up LP and map this strategy to more subgames.
Formally, subgame G s has initial state s, where the defender's strategy space pS Gs , A Gs q includes all states reachable from s (i.e., if s 1 in S Gs transits to s 2 , then s 2 P S Gs ) with the corresponding action space, and the adversary's strategy space includes all paths generating h s , i.e., O hs . 6 Here, the defender has the same action space in states with the same location for her. Given states s 1 and s 2 , O hs 1 is similar to O hs 2 after ηph s1 q if ηph s1 q " ηph s2 q, and a oneto-one correspondence exists between O hs 1 and O hs 2 such that each such pair o 1 P O hs 1 and o 2 P O hs 2 satisfies qph s1 , o 1 q " qph s2 , o 2 q (qph 1 , h 2 q is a subsequence of h 2 after ηph 1 q such that h 1 Y qph 1 , h 2 q " h 2 ). That is, the adversary has the same move space after ηph s1 q by both sets.
Two subgames G s1 and G s2 are similar if l s1 " l s2 , and O hs 1 is similar to O hs 2 after ηph s1 q. Then, states s i P S s1 and s j P S s2 are similar if l si " l sj and qph s1 , h si q " qph s2 , h sj q. The best response strategy π s1 in G s1 against y is defined by: Given the best response π against y by BR, π s1 ps 1 q " πps 1 qp@s 1 P S Gs 1 q.
Here, for s 1 P S Gs 1 , if s 1 is reached from s 1 by π s1 , we define P πs 1 ps 1 q " 1; otherwise, P πs 1 ps 1 q " 0. Therefore, a mapping strategy π s1Ñs2 from G s1 to its similar subgame G s2 is defined by: Given π s1 defined by Eq.(7), @s j P S Gs 2 ,
where s i in S Gs 1 and s j are similar. We use this mapping only if the adversary takes both paths at each pair of the one-to-one correspondence between O hs 1 and O hs 2 with the same probability. This mapping could happen at the iteration when π s1 is computed during calling BR or at the future iterations due to the loop in IGRS. Theorem 4. For any G s1 with π s1 defined by Eq. (7) as the best response in G s1 against y, if G s2 is its similar subgame with y 1 satisfying y o1 " y 1 o2 for each pair o 1 P O hs 1 and o 2 P O hs 2 with qph s1 , o 1 q " qph s2 , o 2 q in the one-to-one correspondence between O hs 1 and O hs 2 , then π s1Ñs2 defined by Eq. (8) is the best response in G s2 against y 1 .
A defender strategy π ‹ s in G s is optimal in NEST if given any strategy y over O and any policy π s in G s , V πs psq ď V π ‹ s psq, and we say that this π ‹ s is part of the equilibrium in NEST. π ‹ s is defined by: Given π s defined by Eq. (7) as the best response in G s against some y over O with y o ą 0
Lemma 1. Given any y over O, V (9), the defender will certainly catch the adversary in G s . Therefore, after computing π ‹ s in G s , if G s is reached again, the defender's expected utility ř oPO hs y o is returned immediately. Therefore, LP for the restricted game can exclude constraints and variables for the succeeding states of s; and, for any adversary strategy, BR does not need to compute the best response starting from s anymore, which will speed up LP and BR.
We can map π ‹ s1 defined by Eq.(9) in G s1 to its similar subgames through Eq.(8). Besides, we can map this π ‹ s1 to more subgames, where the initial location of m resources is not l s1 . In fact, given π ‹ s1 , we can trace the interdiction back to which resource r starting from s 1 contributes to this interdiction by following π ‹ s1 , and we may find that we only need part of m resources to interdict the adversary. Then, we only need to map the actions of these key resources to other subgames to capture the adversary certainly. For example, consider G s1 and G s2 , where l s1 " pv 1 , v 2 q, l s2 " pv 1 , v 3 q, O hs 1 is similar to O hs 2 after ηph s1 q, and only the first resource in G s1 will contribute to the interdiction by π ‹ s1 . Then, the adversary will be captured certainly in G s2 if the resource initially at v 1 in G s2 takes the action of the resource initially at v 1 in G s1 by π ‹ s1 . Formally, we define this strategy mapping between semisimilar subgames. Two subgames G s1 and G s2 are semisimilar on l if l Ď l s1 , l Ď l s2 , and O hs 1 is similar to O hs 2 after ηph s1 q. Similar subgames are certainly semi-similar. 8 Here, s i P S s1 and s j P S s2 are semi-similar if l, with l Ď l si and l Ď l sj , is reached from l by the corresponding resources in s 1 and s 2 , respectively, and qph s1 , h si q " qph s2 , h sj q. (10) is optimal in NEST. The second technique is to add multiple defender best response strategies at one iteration to reduce the number of iterations for the convergence of IGRS. More specifically, we sample multiple adversary strategies to add the corresponding defender's best response strategies to the restricted game GpS 1 , A 1 q by calling BR in IGRS at one iteration. We sample a uniform strategy over O hs for each state s in GpS 1 , A 1 q based on the following intuition. On the one hand, for different adversary strategies, the corresponding best response strategies involve different states and actions that will be added to GpS 1 , A 1 q before the convergence of IGRS, and the number of iterations will be enormous if the strategy space is large. At each iteration, LP will be solved once to generate the adversary equilibrium strategy in GpS 1 , A 1 q. If we can sample some of these strategies, then we can reduce the number of iterations of IGRS and times to solve LP. On the other hand, if s is added to GpS 1 , A 1 q (i.e., s is part of the best response), at least one of the paths in O hs is in the support set of the equilibrium strategy in GpS 1 , A 1 q. Then, it is possible that the adversary will escape through the paths in O hs , and the defender needs a corresponding strategy to interdict him. To generate such a strategy immediately, we can sample a uniform strategy over O hs and then call BR.
Finally, IGRS embedded with the above two additional techniques (IGRS++) is still optimal.
Theorem 7. IGRS++ converges to an NE.
Experimental Evaluation
We demonstrate the efficiency of our algorithms through numerical experiments. We use CPLEX (version 12.6) machine with a 3.2GHz quad core CPU and 16GB memory. All results are averaged over 30 randomly generated instances. All random planar graphs are generated by the grid model with random edges (Peng et al. 2014) , which samples an LˆW square grid where horizontal/vertical edges between neighbors are generated with probability p, and diagonal ones with q. We choose p from r0.4, 0.9s and q from r0.0, 0.5s to match most real-world road networks. In our evaluation, v a 0 is located at the center node, m defender resources are uniformly distributed on the network at initialization, and |V e | exit nodes are randomly distributed at the border. By default, L " W " 5, pp," p0.5, 0.1q, horizon t max " L, |V e | " 10, and m " 4. Solution Quality: We compare the solution quality of our approach (represented by IGRS++) with one baseline, the algorithm for the discussed network security game model (Jain et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 2017 ) considering timedependent strategies, denoted as NSG. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) vary parameters: (1) the number of intersections, denoted by LˆW , and (2) edge generation probabilities. It can be seen that IGRS++ significantly outperforms NSG. These results are similar to ones for varying the number of exit nodes or resources (not shown here). Here the defender's utility does not decrease with the size of the network because although the adversary has more strategies on larger networks, the defender can exploit more real-time information about him.
We evaluate the influence of the horizon t max on the solution quality on networks with different scales in Figure 2 (c) and networks with different density of edges in Figure 2(d) . Results show that the defender's expected utility converges when t max is large enough, e.g., t max is almost equal to L. Scalability: We evaluate the scalability of IGRS with two baselines: (1) using the bounds setting in (Bošanskỳ et al. 2014) for IGRS (IGRS+OldB), and (2) only using our new lower bound setting without the tight upper bound for IGRS (IGRS-UB). Specifically, IGRS+OldB can cut some branches only when the searching player's information set has at least two nodes. To be fair, each state s in IGRS+OldB is treated as a defender's information set, and each child history of h s corresponds to one node in this information set. In addition, to evaluate our second technique at Section 6.3, we have a baseline, IGRS+Same, where IGRS++ uses the method that adds several best response strategies against the same adversary strategy based on (Wang, Yin, and An 2016) . Figures 2(e) -2(h) show that: 1) The runtime generally increases except that it reflects the "easy-hardeasy" pattern in security games (Jain, Leyton-Brown, and Tambe 2012) in Figure 2 (g). 2) IGRS++ significantly outperforms IGRS and IGRS+Same, especially when the size of the problem is extremely large. 3) IGRS significantly outperforms IGRS-UB, and IGRS-UB significantly outperforms IGRS+OldB. To further evaluate the effect of our pruning techniques, Figure 2 (i) shows the number of evaluated states for computing the best response against the adversary's uniform strategy, i.e., y o " 1{|O|p@o P Oq, where results are consistent with the ones in Figures 2(e)-2(h). Here, IGRS+Same runs slower than IGRS because its BR evaluates too many states to compute several best response strategies, and it adds too many strategies to the restricted game.
Results in
The Real-World Network: We also evaluate our approach on the road network of the whole Manhattan island of New York as shown in Figure 2 (j). In this network, there are 702 nodes with 1,216 links extracted from OSM (www.openstreetmap.org). The initial positions of four po-lice officers and the adversary are chosen randomly, and seven exit nodes are chosen based on the connection to the external world of the island. A total of 30 cases with different adversary initial positions are tested. As shown in Figures 2(k) and 2(l) (note that IGRS-UB and IGRS+OldB cannot run on networks of this size), results are consistent with ones in Figures 2(a) -2(i) on random networks. In particular, IGRS++ significantly outperforms others and efficiently solves NEST until the defender's expected utility converges.
Conclusions
This paper studies the problem of optimal interdiction of urban criminals with the aid of real-time information. We show that ignoring such information can cause an arbitrarily large loss and then propose our NEST. We show that solving NEST is NP-hard, therefore develop an optimal algorithm IGRS++ to solve it efficiently. Extensive experiments show the effectiveness of our approach in a wide range of settings.
